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Open Secrets: Protecting the Identity of
the CIA's Intelligence Gatherers in a First
Amendment Society
By Meri West Maffet*
The traditional conflict between first amendment rights of free
expression and national security needs for secrecy is most inti-
mately felt in the sub rosa world of intelligence gathering. The use
of covert operators1 to gather intelligence about rival nations has
been recognized since ancient times as invaluable to the preserva-
tion of a nation's security2 Congress recognized this fact when it
enacted the National Security Act of 1947,3 which established the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). To accomplish their
mission, intelligence gatherers must operate in secrecy. In our soci-
ety, however, public access to government information is the ideo-
logically preferred rule,4 and exceptions are subject to strict scru-
tiny and suspicion.5 Protecting the identities of covert operators in
a first amendment society thus is difficult.
An identity protection crisis has developed recently in the
* B.A., 1974, M.P.A., 1976, University of Kansas. Member, Second Year Class.
1. In this Note, the terms "covert operator" and "covert operative" are used to signify
any intelligence gatherer whose relationship with the CIA the United States government is
attempting to conceal. A person so identified is not necessarily specifically involved in "cov-
ert operations," that is, intelligence operations having as their objective control over the
internal politics of a foreign nation and achieved by infiltration of the political apparatus of
that nation.
2. It is believed that intelligence services first emerged in the Near East around the
13th Century B.C. For a detailed history of the development of intelligence from the Egyp-
tian civilization to the Muscovy dynasty, see F. DVORNIK, ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
(1974). For a history of European and American intelligence, see A. DULLEs, THE CRAFT OF
INTELLIGENCE 9-47 (1963).
3. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); Government in
the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app., at
697 (1973).
5. Exemptions to the FOIA are found at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). Challenges to
governmental reliance upon exemptions to deny access to certain kinds of information have
become more frequent in recent years. See notes 27-32 & accompanying text infra.
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American intelligence community. Continuing, willful disclosures
of the identities of suspected CIA covert operatives 6 by domestic
opponents of the CIA7 have led to assassination attempts and dis-
ruption of United States activities abroad, and allegedly have led
to the death of at least one CIA officer." Yet no action is taken
against the persons who disclose such information. The predictable
result of such disclosure and its aftermath is an adverse effect on
CIA recruitment, morale, and the willingness of foreign intelligence
services to cooperate with the CIA.9 More serious are the cumula-
tive effects of such disclosures on the continued vitality of the CIA,
United States foreign policy, national security, and, ultimately, the
6. For purposes of this Note, the terms "(covert) intelligence operatives" and "(covert)
intelligence gatherers" include non-United States government employees who covertly pro-
vide information to United States intelligence missions. These individuals are commonly
referred to as "informants," "sources," or "contacts." United States government employees
or officers within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104, 2105 (1976) who covertly collect intelli-
gence information and disgorge it to the United States government are usually designated as
"intelligence agents," "intelligence officers," and "employees."
7. For example, the Covert Action Information Bulletin, published six times per year,
provides its 6,000 subscribers with expos6s on alleged CIA covert operations as well as lists
of names of "suspected" CIA agents. The periodical is published in Washington, D.C. by co-
editors William Schaap, Ellen Ray, and Louis Wolf. Former CIA agent Philip Agee, who has
authored several books "exposing" CIA operations and operatives, is a contributing editor.
See Taubman, Gadfly Exposes C.I.A.'s Covert Activities, New York Times, July 10, 1980, §
A, at 12, col. 1.
8. In 1975, Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, was murdered after an
article in the magazine Counter-Spy identified him as an intelligence agent. Although it has
never been conclusively established that Welch was identified and killed specifically because
of the Counter-Spy publication, both the CIA and the White House suggested that his
death came "at least in part as a result of the publication of his name." See New York
Times, Dec. 24, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 2; Halperin, CIA News Management, Washington Post,
Jan. 23, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 1.
In July, 1980 the home of a United States Embassy official in Kingston, Jamaica was
sprayed with submachine gun fire. The action took place the day after Louis Wolf, editor of
the Covert Action Information Bulletin, revealed in a news conference the names of and
identifying information regarding 15 persons he claimed were CIA agents working out of the
embassy in Kingston. Several nights later, an abortive attack was staged on the home of
another of the 15 persons named by Wolf at his news conference. The State Department
later gave permission for the persons named and their families to leave that country. See
New York Times, July 5, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 5; Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of the CIA, to the San Francisco Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980) (copy on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
9. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting 456
F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (E.D. Va. 1978); Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1979) (statement of William E. Colby) [hereinafter cited as Espionage
Hearings].
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world balance of power. 10
This Note explores the means by which the federal govern-
ment can meet the need for providing greater protection to its in-
telligence gatherers and, at the same time, ensure government ac-
countability and the preservation of the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Note first ex-
amines the extent to which the identity of intelligence sources may
be protected under current law. The Note then traces the develop-
ment of the current "identity protection crisis," including first
amendment issues raised by attempts to protect the identity of in-
telligence gatherers. Finally, the Note examines the feasibility of
providing greater protection to identity by amending the Freedom
of Information Act11 (FOIA) and enacting a narrowly constructed
criminal statute that would punish deliberate disclosure.
Protection Afforded by Current Law
The National Security Act of 194712 gives the Director of the
CIA responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure."13 The Act is silent, however, on the
acceptable means and extent of such protection.
A diverse body of national security law presently provides for
the protection of sensitive government information through such
measures as classification orders,14 exemptions from the FOIA,15
and espionage statutes.11 Information that may reveal the identity
of intelligence sources, like other types of sensitive government in-
formation, may be protected from unathorized disclosure in several
ways under current law: (1) by restricting access to such informa-
tion, (2) by legally prohibiting the dissemination of certain infor-
mation through the use of injunctions (prior restraint), and (3) by
deterring disclosure through the imposition of civil or criminal
penalties upon those who disclose the information (subsequent
punishment).
To facilitate a cohesive and systematic analysis of the extent
10. See notes 164-72 & accompanying text infra.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
12. 61 Stat. 495 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 10, 50 U.S.C.)-
13. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
14. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
16. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e), 794(a) (1976).
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to which this diverse body of national security law may provide
protection to identity, each applicable provision of national secur-
ity law will be analyzed according to the following disclosure para-
digm: who (the disseminator) disclosed what kind of information
to whom (the receiver) with what intent and, under certain cir-
cumstances, with what result.
Preventing Ascertainment
The government's first defense against revelation of the iden-
tity of its intelligence gatherers is to conceal effectively the rela-
tionship between the individual operative and the CIA. The gov-
ernment seeks to accomplish this in two ways: (1) by disguising
the relationship through the use of "cover"17 and clandestine com-
munications, and (2) by restricting general access to information in
the government's possession that would reveal the relationship.
The use of cover and clandestine operations to conceal identity in-
volves technical considerations beyond the scope of this Note.
Restriction of access to information such as intelligence iden-
tity may be accomplished legally by means of an executive classifi-
cation order specifying that the information be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order No.
12,06518 is one such order; it provides for the classification of sensi-
tive government information, including the identity of intelligence
sources, if "an original classification authority. . . determines that
its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause
at least identifiable damage to the national security. ' 9 By classify-
ing information, the government determines who will have author-
ized access and how, through the use of internal security mea-
sures,2 0 those not having authorized access will be prevented from
17. "Cover" refers to an intelligence operative's use of an assumed name and identity
to disguise his or her relationship with the Agency. Improving cover to increase protection
of intelligence identities has been the subject of recent congressional discussion. The pro-
posed Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1980, see note 216-74 & accompanying text
infra, included a mandate to the President to establish procedures to ensure that cover for
covert operatives effectively would be provided and protected. See S. 2216, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980), reprinted in S. REP. No. 96-896, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as S. 2216].
18. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979).
19. Id. §§ 1-301(c), -302. See also id. § 1-303 (unauthorized disclosure of foreign gov-
ernment information or identity of confidential foreign source presumed to cause identifi-
able damage to national security).
20. Id. § 4-103. See generally id. §§ 4-101 to -405.
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gaining access. Thus, the government effectively limits the official
dissemination of confidential information to a select group of
receivers."
Classified information is expressly exempt from disclosure
under the FOIA, which was passed in 1967 to provide public access
to information held by the executive branch of government.22 This
exemption, however, is not an absolute defense against the disclo-
sure of classified information relating to identity. For the govern-
ment to withhold classified information from the general public be-
cause of the information's sensitive relationship to national
security interests, it must be able to show that the information was
properly "classified" 2 -- that the original classification was made
by a person having proper authority to do so-and is properly
"classifiable" 2 -that the substantive nature of the information 25
properly conforms to an enumerated classification category.2 6
In addition, in a suit filed to challenge the government's re-
fusal to release information under exemptions to the FOIA, a trial
court may examine documents in camera to determine the propri-
ety of their exempt status. 7 This possibility can project the judici-
ary into the role of ultimate arbiter of classification decisions and
reduce to speculation traditional expectations of confidentiality as-
sociated with the classification process.
Although most courts are reluctant to overrule agency classifi-
21. These receivers must be "determined to be trustworthy" and must require access
to the classified information "for the performance of official duties." Id. § 4-101.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976) exempts "matters that are ... specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and. . . are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order .... .
23. Id. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, §§ 1-301 to -302, 3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979). See also
id. § 1-201 to -205 (determination of who has classification authority).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). See Exec. Order No. 12,065, §§ 1-301 to -302, 3 C.F.R.
190, 193 (1979).
25. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-301, 3 C.F.R. 190, 191 (1979).
26. The enumerated classification categories are "confidential," "secret," and "top se-
cret." Id. § 1-101 to -104.
27. This applies to in camera inspection of materials claimed as exempt under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (b)(3) (1976). See, e.g., Lead Indus. As'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 87-88
(2d Cir. 1979); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weissman v. CIA,
565 F.2d 692, 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bell v. United States, 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir.
1977). The standard for determining the necessity of in camera inspection is "[w]hether the
district judge believes that in camera inspection is needed in order to make a responsible de
novo determination on the claims of exemption." Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187,1195 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). .
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cationss the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, which decides many FOIA cases, places on the govern-
ment the burden of proving the validity of its classification desig-
nations.29 This allocation of the burden of proof forces intelligence
agencies to "disclose increasing amounts of information in an at-
tempt to accomplish a task which is inherently impossible, that is,
to describe publicly the classified information and damage that
would result from its release. 30 As "full public description of the
[classified] information in most cases is tantamount to releasing
the information itself,' ' future confidentiality of validly classified
information is threatened by the operation of such a practice.2
Thus, even if information that relates to the identity of intelli-
gence operatives is properly classified, classification and its corre-
sponding exemption under the FOIA offer only a theoretical shield
against disclosure. Furthermore, classification cannot prevent in-
tentional unauthorized disclosures. As the proliferation of infor-
mation leaks at all levels of government has illustrated, unau-
thorized disclosure of confidential information, rather than
unauthorized access, is the problem underlying the identity protec-
tion crisis that has developed in recent years. Any attempt to pro-
vide protection for identity, therefore, must center on discouraging
disclosure through prior restraint or subsequent punishment.
Prior Restraint
Prior restraint offers a second method of preventing the dis-
closure of sensitive government information. Two types of prior re-
straint are potentially available to prevent disclosure of identity:
(1) prior restraint on publication of national security information,3
28. See cases cited note 27 supra.
29. See, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weissman v. CIA,
565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Impact of the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act on Intelligence Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th. Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (statement
of Daniel B. Silver) [hereinafter cited as FOIA Hearing].
30. FOIA Hearing, supra note 29, at 45.
31. Id.
32. The identity of a covert operative conceivably may be imperiled by less direct rev-
elations. Because the kinds of information that could facilitate identification may not be
readily apparent to those lacking intelligence operations experience, a court may order the
release of information that would inadvertently facilitate an identification.
33. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 141 (testimony of John Maury).
34. For purposes of this Note, "national security information" signifies information
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and (2) prior restraint on publication of information by those in
privity with the CIA, when such information has not received pre-
publication clearance from the Agency.
Prior Restraint on Publication of National Security Information
Prior restraint on the publication of national security informa-
tion seeks to prevent the publication of information deemed so
harmful to national security that its value to the general public as
a contribution to informed debate is outweighed by the potential
danger arising from its dissemination. Although the first amend-
ment does not absolutely bar prior restraint, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that prior censorship of expression can
be justified only by the most compelling government interest.8
The concept of justifying prior restraint on publication on the
basis of national security developed from Chief Justice Hughes's
statement in Near v. Minnesota8 that exceptional situations may
exist that would justify prior restraint.3 7 The Court in Near rea-
soned that prior restraint may be necessary to enable the govern-
ment to "prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of sailing dates of transports or the number and loca-
tion of troops."38
The United States first attempted to restrain the press from
publication of national security information in New York Times
Co. v. United States"9 (Pentagon Papers). In Pentagon Papers,
the government sought to enjoin the New York Times from pub-
lishing sections of a Pentagon-commissioned top secret history of
the military involvement in Vietnam. The government claimed
that publication would give advantage to the enemy and weaken
the United States' diplomatic efforts, thereby prolonging the
United States' involvement in Vietnam. 40 The Court, in a six to
that "bears directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our
foreign relations" within the meaning of Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975
Compilation).
35. "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
36. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
37. Id. at 716.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
40. Brief for the United States at 6, 16-18, 23-25, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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three per curiam opinion, 41 refused injunctive relief on the ground
that the government had not met its burden of showing justifica-
tion for an injunction.42 Although they disagreed on the proper
scope of that burden, several Justices suggested that a standard
should take into consideration the elements of gravity, directness,
immediacy, and irreparability of harm.43
It was not until United States v. Progressive, Inc.44 that the
government successfully sought an injunction against the press in
connection with publication of national security information. 45 The
Progressive planned to publish an article, compiled from public
documents, describing the details of hydrogen bomb design." It as-
serted that, by publishing the information, it was contributing to
informed citizen opinion regarding nuclear weaponry and demon-
strating the inadequacies of government secrecy and classifica-
tion.47 The government argued that publication would increase
thermonuclear proliferation and would "lead to use or threats
that would 'adversely affect the national security of the United
States.' "48
Applying both the Near "troop movement" analogy and the
41. In articulating their individual opinions, the Justices expressed a wide range of
ideas as to when, if ever, and under what circumstances prior restraint is appropriate. Jus-
tices Black and Douglas predictably held their "absolutist" viewpoint of the first amend-
ment, arguing that no system of prior restraint is ever justified. See 403 U.S. at 714-20
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 720-24 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, White,
Stewart, and Marshall maintained that prior restraints constitutionally could be imposed on
the press, but only in certain situations. No uniform standard was adopted in the case, but
all proposals focused upon the harmfulness of the disclosure to the United States. Two Jus-
tices echoed the standard proposed by the government in the case, reasoning that prior
restraints could be imposed to prevent the occurrence of grave and irreparable harm. See id.
at 732 (White, J., concurring); id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Stewart proposed
what is the most often recited standard-that to justify a prior restraint there must be a
threat of "direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people." Id. at
730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan took this test one step further, stating that
"only government allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and imme-
diately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." Id. at 726-27
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan suggested that a peacetime equivalent to "imper-
iling the safety of a transport already at sea" would be "set[ting] in motion a nuclear holo-
caust." Id. at 726.
42. Id. at 714.
43. See note 41 supra.
44. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
45. Id. at 996.
46. Id. at 990-91.
47. Id. at 993-94.
48. Id. at 995.
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"grave, direct, immediate and irreparable harm" test suggested in
Pentagon Papers, the court stated: "Times have changed signifi-
cantly since 1931 when Near was decided . . .. [W]ar by foot
soldiers has been replaced in large part by war by machines and
bombs. No longer need there be any advance warning or any prep-
aration time before a nuclear war [can] be commenced."'49 The
court thus concluded that publication of the details of nuclear
bomb design presented a danger analogous to the publication of
troop movements in time of war.50 The court found the injunction
to be justified based upon the "disparity of risk" between the cur-
tailment of the defendant's first amendment rights and the threat
of increased nuclear proliferation and thermonuclear annihilation,
the success of the government in meeting its burden of proof to
show justification for the imposition of prior restraint on publica-
tion, and the lack of a plausible showing that suppression of the
technical portions of the article would "impede the defendants in
their laudable crusade to stimulate public knowledge of nuclear ar-
mament and bring about enlightened debate on national policy
questions." 51
The court distinguished Pentagon Papers on three grounds:
(1) the Pentagon Papers study contained historical data relating to
events that had occurred three to twenty years previously; (2) in
Pentagon Papers, no cogent reasons were advanced by the govern-
ment concerning how the article adversely affected national secur-
ity except that publication might cause embarrassment to the
United States; and (3) unlike the situation in Pentagon apers, a
specific statute was involved.2 The court indicated, however, that
a preliminary injunction would be warranted even in the absence
of statutory authority because the "direct, immediate and irrepara-
ble" harm standard was met.53
In light of the showing of harm in Progressive, it is unclear
whether a prior restraint on the publication of the identities of
49. Id. at 996.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 994. The government contended that the defendants were in violation of 42
U.S.C. §§ 2274(b), 2280 (1976), which authorize the issuance of injunctive relief when the
defendant proposes to disclose restricted data regarding atomic energy "with reason to be-
lieve that such data will be utilized to injure the U.S. or to secure an advantage to any
foreign nation. . . ." Id. at 993.
53. Id. at 1000.
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covert intelligence operatives could be justified on national security
grounds. Arguably, some of the same kinds of harm may result
from the disclosure of identities as may result from the disclosure
of troop movements: in both cases, the threat of death to govern-
ment agents is real,5 the element of surprise, and thus advantage,
is lost,5 5 substantial costs in terms of personnel replacement, train-
ing, morale, and strategy may be incurred, 5 and, ultimately, na-
tional security may be endangered.5
Although the kind of ultimate harm that may result from the
disclosure of troop movements or nuclear bomb design details also
may result from disclosure of identity, and although the harm
flowing from the disclosure of identity may be immediate, direct,
grave, and irreparable, 58 in most cases such disclosures do not con-
stitute an immediate and direct danger. Rather, they steadily drain
intelligence and defense capabilities.5 9 Cumulative damage to a na-
54. See FOIA Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of Frank C. Carlucci). See note
8 supra.
55. See generally A. DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE (1960); Address by Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, to the San Francisco Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980)
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
56. See Proposals to Criminalize the Unauthorized Disclosure of the Identities of
Undercover United States Intelligence Officers and Agents: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11, 14-15 (1980) (statement of Frank C. Carlucci) [hereinafter cited as Intelligence
Hearings].
57. See Id. at 15-17.
58. For example, if, during the first few months of the United States hostage ordeal in
Iran, the press had published the names of the hostages and labeled several as CIA agents,
the publication of this information could have had dire consequences for the individual hos-
tages, as well as severe United States foreign policy ramifications involving one of the
world's major oil suppliers.
59. From the standpoint of threat to human life, the disclosure of the identity of an
intelligence operative usually places the lives of only a handful of persons in direct and
immediate personal danger, whereas the revelation of troop movements may endanger
thousands, and the disclosure of nuclear bomb design, millions. Such identification, how-
ever, may have the effect of stimulating general anti-American sentiment that may manifest
itself in a variety of ways, including acts of violence directed at United States citizens and
businesses abroad.
With respect to political gain, disclosures of confidential information may provide an
adversary with direct and immediate benefit. For example, by gaining knowledge of an op-
ponent's troop movements, a warring nation may attain decisive strategic advantage and
ensure victory. Similarly, by obtaining information regarding nuclear weaponry, a nation
acquires military superiority that may be used advantageously to negotiate with or to intim-
idate, compromise, or subjugate other nations. By comparison, uncovering the identity of a
single intelligence operative affords little potential for such substantial direct and immedi-
ate political gain. The results of multiple disclosures over time, however, may have the same
decisive political significance as the threat of nuclear war or troop ambush, for each disclo-
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tion's intelligence gathering ability over a long period may be as
devastating to national security as the disclosure of hydrogen
bomb technology, but the Pentagon Papers-Progressive standard
for the imposition of a prior restraint on the publication of na-
tional security information recognizes only direct, immediate,
grave, and irreparable harm. The availability of prior restraint on
the publication of national security information as a "protection"
for identity, therefore, is doubtful in most cases.8 0
Prior Restraint on Publication- Those in Privity with the CIA
Courts have also allowed injunctive relief in situations in
which persons in privity with the CIA by virtue of employment or
a secrecy agreement violate such agreements by seeking to publish
information regarding the CIA without first submitting the infor-
mation to prepublication review.
Employees of the CIA routinely are required to sign a secrecy
agreement as a condition of their employment with the Agency and
a termination secrecy agreement or oath upon their departure from
the Agency."' These agreements require that an agent
not... publish... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
during or after the term of... employment... without spe-
cific prior approval of the Agency, [and never reveal] any classi-
fied information, or any information concerning intelligence or
CIA that has not been made public by CIA... without the ex-
press written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his
representative."2
Cases involving prior restraint that seek enforcement of such
secrecy agreements are fairly recent. In United States v. Marchet-
sure may lead inferentially to the disclosure of other intelligence identities and operations,
and erode the finite reserve of trained agents and potential sources who gather intelligence
vital to preserving national security.
60. Not only does the availability of this remedy depend upon judicial determination
of the harmfulness of a single disclosure, it presumes that the government has the ability to
determine in every instance when and where disclosures will take place. In addition, it
places upon the courts the burdensome role of enforcing the injunctions or restraining or-
ders that are issued.
61. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1312, 1316-17 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
62. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 & n.1 (1980) (per curiam). See also
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1312 nn.1-2 (4th Cir.), cert.-denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
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ti,"' the court enjoined ex-CIA agent Marchetti from publishing a
book that contained classified information concerning the CIA."
Marchetti argued that the secrecy agreement was unenforceable
because it operated as an infringement of his first amendment
rights . 5 The court held that such agreements do not abridge an
agent's right to free speech because they only purport to prevent
disclosure of classified information, which is justified because of
the government's need for secrecy.6 The court indicated that a
system of "contractual" prior restraint is preferable to the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions in these cases because "the risk of harm
from disclosure is so great and maintenance of the confidentiality
of the information so necessary that greater and more positive as-
surance is warranted. '67 The court, however, reasoned that the
first amendment precluded even contractual restraints from ex-
tending to republication of information that is "unclassified or offi-
cially disclosed. '68
A more recent case involving contractual prior restraint,
Snepp v. United States,9 raises the possibility that prior re-
straints enforcing secrecy agreements might be extended to infor-
mation that is "unclassified but harmful. 7 0 Snepp, a former CIA
agent, published a book about his experiences in Vietnam without
first submitting it to the CIA for prepublication clearance." Al-
though the government did not contend that the book contained
classified information, it attempted to enjoin Snepp from further
publication without clearance. 2 The government also sought to im-
pose a constructive trust on all profits from the book on the theory
that Snepp had breached a fiduciary duty to the Agency by failing
to submit to prepublication review.78
The Supreme Court granted the government both the injunc-
tive and constructive trust remedies. However, in allowing both
remedies the Court spoke in confusing terms about "harmful" but
63. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
64. 466 F.2d at 1313, 1318.
65. Id. at 1311.
66. Id. at 1317.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1318.
69. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 511-12.
71. Id. at 507.
72. Id. at 510.
73. Id. at 508.
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"unclassified" information, stating that, although the government
"does not deny-as a general principle-Snepp's right to publish
unclassified information . . . [w]hen a former agent relies on his
own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may re-
veal information that the CIA, with its broader understanding
of what may expose classified information and confidential sources,
could have identified as harmful."7' The Court reasoned that
Snepp should have given the CIA an opportunity to examine his
manuscript for information that would "compromise classified in-
formation or sources."7 5
The harm that the Court perceived as flowing from both the
content of Snepp's book and his act of publication without prepub-
lication clearance was the impairment of the effectiveness of intel-
ligence activities vital to national security. The Court concluded
that Snepp's flouting of his secrecy agreement could raise public
doubt about the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of sensitive
information. 0 Under Marchetti and Snepp the CIA may attempt
to avert such harm contractually by requiring that the Agency be
allowed to screen all manuscripts relating to the CIA written by
those in privity with it. 77 The Court in Snepp, however, did not go
beyond recognizing the potential danger posed by publication of
harmful but unclassified information; what the Agency can do if it
finds information in these manuscripts that is not 'classified but
that it believes may compromise sources and methods is unclear.
In light of the CIA employee's first amendment right to publish
unclassified information, 8 it appears that the CIA can only try to
persuade the writer to exclude the information voluntarily.
Although contractual prior restraint technically meets consti-
tutional muster, it suffers the same disabilities as other forms of
prior restraint: unpopularity,7 9 the need to anticipate disclosure,
and the burden of judicial enforcement. Even though such a rem-
edy is available against the persons most likely to have information
relating to identity-those in privity with the CIA-it does not ap-
ply to other disseminators. In view of these difficulties, the govern-
74. Id. at 511-12.
75. Id. at 511.
76. Id. at 512.
77. 466 F.2d at 1317, 444 U.S. at 511-12.
78. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
79. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
IDENTITY PROTECTIONJuly 1981]
ment has traditionally considered subsequent punishment as a
more desirable deterrent to disclosure.80
Subsequent Punishment
The third method of preventing disclosure of sensitive govern-
ment information is subsequent punishment, the imposition of
civil and criminal penalties for the revelation of confidential infor-
mation. " Civil actions may be brought against those who are
deemed to be in privity with the government by virtue of employ-
ment or by having signed a nondisclosure agreement. Criminal
sanctions, by contrast, may be imposed without regard to privity.
Civil Actions
In Snepp v. United States,82 the Supreme Court discussed
two alternative grounds for bringing civil actions against those in
privity with the CIA who publish without prepublication clear-
ance: a breach of trust action ss and a breach of contract action."
A breach of trust action seeking to impose a constructive trust
on all personal profits derived from the exploitation of information
gained through employment with the CIA may be imposed when a
disseminator who stands in a "relationship of trust" with the
Agency violates that fiduciary obligation to the Agency.85 In
Snepp, the Court determined that a "relationship of special trust"
was shown by the "special trust reposed in [Snepp] and the agree-
ment that he signed." 80 Snepp's breach of trust was his failure to
submit his book for prepublication review.87
80. "It would. . . be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for
[the] Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically
declined to prohibit .... The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the Pres-
ident execute laws, and [the] courts interpret laws. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). It did not provide for government by injunction in which the
courts and the Executive Branch can 'make law' without regard to the action of Congress."
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. This Note does not examine the feasibility of prosecution based on the theory that
information is property and therefore that the unauthorized transfer of information may be
a crime involving property. For a consideration of this alternative, see Katz, Government
Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CJiF. L. REV. 108, 125-29 (1976).
82. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 510-13.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 515.
86. Id. at 511.
87. Id.
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There are many questions raised by the almost tautological
nature of the Court's discussion of the elements of an action for
breach of trust. It is unclear, for example, who decides when a
"special trust" reposes in an employee and by what standard this
is determined, whether the "special trust" must be expressly ac-
knowledged by the employee or may be implied from custom or
the duties of the job itself, and whether a secrecy agreement alone
is sufficient to determine that a "special trust" reposes in an
employee.
As a deterrent to future disclosures of the identities of covert
intelligence operatives, the constructive trust may be effective in
some circumstances;'8 the severity of the penalty will deter persons
who publish for monetary gain. For persons whose motivation is
personal retribution or political gain, however, such a measure has
little deterrent effect.
The second remedy discussed in Snepp is a civil action for
breach of contract based on an employee's failure to submit all
writings relating to the Agency for prepublication clearance, a
valid condition of the contractual secrecy agreement with the
Agency. Because of the degree of uncertainty associated with the
calculation of damages, the Court in Snepp summarily dismissed
the governmental use of breach of contract to deter the disclosure
of intelligence identities.8 9 The Court stated that the publication of
Snepp's book "impair[ed] the CIA's ability to perform its statutory
duties,"90 but the specific items of damages, the increasing reluc-
tance of foreign sources to cooperate with the CIA, and the endan-
germent of the lives of intelligence operatives stationed abroad,91
would be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. 2 Nominal dam-
ages certainly have no deterrent effect, and, although award of pu-
nitive damages might have some deterrent effect, it would "bear no
relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's un-
just gain."93 The Court also noted that punitive damages are not a
88. The Department of Justice has attempted to clarify the use of this remedy by
issuing guidelines that govern the Department's activities in connection with the enforce-
ment of predissemination review obligations. See Attorney General's Guidelines for Litiga-
tion to Enforce Obligations to Submit Materials for Predissemination Review, [1980] 6 ME-
DIA L. REP. (BNA) 2261.
89. 444 U.S. at 514.
90. Id. at 512.
91. Id. at 512-13.
92. Id. at 514.
93. Id.
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practical deterrent, because "[p]roof of the tortious conduct neces-
sary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force the Gov-
ernment to disclose some of the very confidences that [the em-
ployee in privity] promised to protect."'94
The civil actions available to subject persons to liability for
unlawful disclosure of confidential information thus focus on a lim-
ited group of disseminators and do not reach those not in privity
with the CIA. Subsequent punishment in the form of criminal
sanctions may be effective, however, in deterring other potential
disseminators.
Criminal Statutes
Criminal statutes that prohibit disclosure of sensitive govern-
ment information are of two types: classic espionage statutes that
prohibit unauthorized disclosure of national defense informationP
and classified information statutes that prohibit unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information.9
Classic Espionage Statutes
The identity of covert operatives may be protected by the es-
pionage statutes only if such information properly falls within the
definition of "information relating to the national defense."' 7 This
term has been defined in the context of espionage case law as a
"generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military
and naval establishments and the related activities of national
preparedness."9 8 Although no cases have tested whether informa-
tion leading to the revelation of the identity of a covert intelligence
operative is properly subsumed under this definition, it should be
included in view of the critical, demonstrable relationship such in-
formation has to intelligence gathering and national security.99
The test of whether these espionage statutes provide any sig-
nificant protection for identity is whether a prosecution under
them is likely to succeed. A wide divergence of opinion exists
among legal scholars, prosecutors, and defense attorneys whether
94. Id.
95. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e), 794(a) (1976).
96. E.g., 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1976).
97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e), 794(a) (1976).
98. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941).
99. See note 8 supra; notes 163-74 & accompanying text infra.
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prosecution for disclosure of identity is ever practical under these
espionage statutes because of the difficulties inherent in attempt-
ing to define the elements of each offense and the constitutional
scope of application of the statutes.100
Three separate subsections of the espionage laws potentially
apply to the disclosure of identity; however, difficulties in the in-
terpretation of each section prevent them from being seriously con-
sidered in their present form as viable protections for identity.
The classic espionage statute that is least difficult to construe
is 18 United States Code section 794(a).10 1 Section 794(a) prohibits
any person from directly or indirectly "communicat[ing], de-
liver[ing], or transmit[ting] or attempt[ing] to communicate, de-
liver, or transmit," national defense information to any foreign
power or its representative or citizens. 102 For this section to apply,
the disseminator must act or attempt to act "with intent or reason
to believe that [the information communicated] is to be used to
the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation."' -3
The language of 18 United States Code section 793(d) is sig-
nificantly more ambiguous and complex. 04 It purports to apply
only to disseminators who have lawful possession of, access to, or
100. See generally Intelligence Hearings, supra note 56.
101. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976) provides: "Whoever, with intent or
reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, de-
liver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval
force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or
to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or
indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating
to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of
years or for life."
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1976) reads: "Whoever, lawfully having pos-
session of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book,
signal book, sketch, pbotograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instru-
ment, appliance, or note relating to the national defense which information the possessor
has;reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of
any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communi-
cated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to
be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it,
or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive it ... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both."
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control over documents relating to the national defense or "infor-
mation relating to the national defense which information the pos-
sessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." 10 5 Under
this section, a disseminator must willfully attempt to communicate
or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the re-
stricted documents or information relating to the national defense
to anyone "not entitled to receive it."106 The disseminator may also
commit an offense by willfully retaining this information or by fail-
ing to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United
States entitled to receive it.107
The elements of a violation of section 793(e) are nearly identi-
cal to those of section 793(d) except that the disseminator is de-
fined in section 793(e) as anyone having unauthorized access to or
control over any material or information relating to the national
defense, whereas section 793(d) applies only to persons with au-
thorized access.210 In addition, the offense of retention set forth in
both sections commences at different points in time. In section
793(d) the possessor must return the material only upon de-
mand,109 whereas in section 793(e) the obligation to return arises
upon the unauthorized receipt of such material. 110
The inadequacy of these statutes in deterring disclosure of in-
telligence identities can best be shown by applying the terms of
each statute to a hypothetical case involving a publication dedi-
cated to disclosing the identity of suspected CIA agents. Assume
that the Intelligence Surveillance Group (ISG) is a group of per-
sons who openly advocate reforming or replacing the CIA. As a
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1976) provides: "Whoever, having unautho-
rized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appli-
ance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers,
transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to commLini-
cate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to
any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to
the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it ... [s]hall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
109. Id. § 793(d).
110. Id. § 793(e).
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regular feature in its periodical, the ISG publishes a list of names
and profiles of "suspected CIA agents." The periodical also con-
tains expos6s on CIA activities throughout the world. The publica-
tion has been blamed for inciting terrorist attacks on "suspected
agents" abroad. Although it is aware of these allegations, the group
continues to publish lists of names, and on various occasions mem-
bers make public appearances at which additional identifying in-
formation is given, such as addresses of suspected agents and their
telephone and license plate numbers. The group claims that it
compiles its information solely from public documents, although
the government suspects that a former CIA agent, who is a con-
tributing editor to the periodical, has made available both specific
data and methods of synergyzing information which he or she
learned as a result of his or her employment with the Agency.
Application of Section 794(a) to the ISG Hypothetical
There is considerable authority to support the view that sec-
tion 794(a) should not be applied to the ISG hypothetical because
Congress never intended the section to apply to the act of publish-
ing national defense information."" First, the companion statute to
section 794(a), section 794(b), prohibits public speech regarding
military matters and specifically enumerates communication and
publication as prohibited activities. 11 2 Because the language in sec-
tion 794(b) distinguishes the two activities, the implication is that
by specifying only communication in section 794(a), Congress did
not intend to include the act of "publishing" within the act of
"communication." Second, the legislative hearings on the Espio-
nage Act of 1917113 show that during the debate on proposed sec-
tion 794(c), which would have authorized the President to issue
111. For an exhaustive analysis of the espionage laws, see Edgar & Schmidt, The Es-
pionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 930 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Edgar & Schmidt].
112. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1976) provides: "Whoever, in time of war, with
intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or
communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the movement, num-
bers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war
materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or
conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures un-
dertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or
any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy,
shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
113. 40 Stat. 217.
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regulations prohibiting the publication of designated national de-
fense information, only section 794(b) was discussed as bearing on
the issue of publication of national defense information. 14
Even if section 794(a) is interpreted to subsume the act of
publication under a broad definition of "to communicate," ambigu-
ities in statutory construction still exist that may frustrate the ap-
plication of the statute.115 For example, the meaning of communi-
cating "directly or indirectly" is unclear. Would publishing in the
context set forth in the ISG hypothetical properly be construed as
"indirectly" communicating with a foreign entity or agent if the
group publishes with the knowledge that its periodical will be read
by foreign governments? The intent requirement also is trouble-
some. Would a general goal of exposing the CIA and an expressed
desire to see it reformed or replaced satisfy the requirement of a
specific intent to injure or to disadvantage the United States?
If, however, it is assumed that Congress did not intend that
publication be subsumed under communication, the only questions
that remain are those of definition. How is "communication" to be
distinguished from "publication"? Are the two distinguishable on
the basis of the physical means by which each is accom-
plished-newsprint as opposed to telephone conversations; their
relative permanency-books, magazines, and videotapes as con-
trasted with oral discussion; or the size of the audi-
ence-circulation to thousands rather than to an intimate group of
two or three persons?
Assuming that the act of publication itself is exempt from the
prohibitions of section 794(a), it must then be determined whether
the law also exempts conduct incident to publication. For example,
it is unclear whether the following activities are publication and
therefore perhaps exempt, or are communication and therefore
prohibited: (1) delivering sensitive information to a newspaper, (2)
discussing sensitive information with a free lance writer, a publish-
ing house, or a newspaper, and (3) the act of retaining classified
information by a newspaper in order that it might publish the in-
formation. Are all types of activities that ultimately result in a
printed article shielded by the umbrella of "publication," oi are
114. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 111, at 944, 947.
115. See id. at 943-44. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976) (specific intent require-
ment) with id. § 793(d)-(e) (no specific intent requirement). See, e.g., United States v. Co-
plon, 88 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also text accompanying notes 139-46 infra.
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there activities that can be distinguished as mere communication
susceptible to prosecution?11 These questions must be resolved
before it can be determined whether section 794(a) would apply to
a situation such as that in the ISG hypothetical.
Application of Sections 793(d) and 793(e) to the ISG
Hypothetical
As with section 794(a), there exists substantial doubt whether
sections 793(d) and 793(e) properly can be applied to the act of
publishing when the wording of the statutes prohibits only "com-
municat[ing], deliver[ing] or transmit[ting]."117 If it is assumed
that publication is subsumed under "communication," or at least is
not automatically excluded from it, a number of additional ques-
tions regarding statutory construction must be resolved before ei-
ther section can be applied properly to the ISG hypothetical, in-
cluding:18 (1) how the lawfulness or authorization of possession by
a disseminator is determined; (2) who is "entitled to receive" infor-
mation; (3) what materials and information come within the scope
of "relating to the national defense"; and (4) what degree of culpa-
bility should be attached to the term "willfully."1 19
A disseminator for purposes of section 793(d) is one who has
116. Distinguishing between communication and publication suggests that there is a
possibility of differentiating between freedom of speech and freedom of the press. For a
consideration of the practical concerns provoked by requiring that publication involve par-
ticipation of the media, see Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 111, at 1036.
117. See id. at 1032-38. See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (per curiam). Those who favor applying these twin statutes to situations involving
publishing are encouraged by Justice White's Pentagon Papers concurrence in which he
invited the government to prosecute the New York Times and the Washington Post under §
793(e). Justice White expressed the view that if the government had accurately character-
ized the subject material, prosecution would be justified under § 793(e), which makes it a
crime for an unauthorized possessor of a document "relating to the national defense" to
retain the document willfully and fail to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled
to receive it. 403 U.S. at 737 (White, J., concurring). He noted that the unpublished docu-
ments held by the newspapers were demanded by the government and that their importance
had been known to the counsel for each of the newspapers. Id. at 734. Justice White, how-
ever, restricted his comments regarding § 793 to the act of retention without intimating his
views as to the acts of communication, transmittal, and delivery, which more directly con-
cern the topics examined in this Note.
118. The first amendment concerns associated with imposing criminal sanctions in a
case resembling the ISG hypothetical are discussed at notes 156-203 & accompanying text
infra.
119. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 111, at 998-1058.
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"lawful possession of, access to, [or] control,"12 while for purposes
of section 793(e), he or she is one who has "unauthorized posses-
sion of, access to, [or] control. 1 1 Although it appears that Con-
gress by its choice of words intended to differentiate lawful posses-
sion from unauthorized possession, that is, the legality of the
possession from the fact of authorization, the government has, in
fact, defined both types of possession in terms of appropriate se-
curity clearance. 122 Whether "unauthorized possession" presump-
tively can be established by lack of clearance, thereby making ISG
groups per se unauthorized possessors, remains undetermined. If
such groups construct classified information from public records, a
further question arises: do they have "lawful" possession even if
the government is still attempting to keep the information
confidential?
The "information in the public domain" defense has its roots
in Gorin v. United States,'28 in which the Supreme Court stated
that "[w]here there is no occasion for secrecy, as with reports relat-
ing to national defense, published by authority of Congress or the
military departments, there can. . . in all likelihood be no reason-
able intent to give an advantage to a foreign government.' ' 24
Information within the public domain was further discussed in
United States v. Heine,125 a case involving a German-born Ameri-
can citizen who had collected information from public sources re-
garding American production of aircraft and used the information
to advise the German government of American defense capabili-
ties.126 None of the information was classified. 127 The court stated
that, not only is it lawful to transmit information that the armed
services make lublic, but there is "no warrant for making a dis-
tinction between such information, and information which the ser-
vices have never thought it necessary to withhold at all. '128 A later
decision129 reaffirmed this position, approving a jury instruction
120. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 793(e) (emphasis added).
122. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 190.
123. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
124. Id. at 28.
125. 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
126. Id. at 815.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 816.
129. United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1978), involved a prosecution
under a companion statute to § 793(d)-(e), 18 U.S.C. § 793(0(2) (1976), for failure to report
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that provided that information lawfully available to the public, not
withheld by the federal government, does not relate to the national
defense.130
The defense developed in Gorin and Heine does not address
the situation presented when, through government information
leaks or construction of classified information from unclassified
public sources, information becomes known to the general public
without having been officially released by the government, that is,
when the information is still classified by the government. Some
indication of possible judicial direction is given in United States v.
Progressive, Inc.,13 1 in which the court specifically addressed the
information synergy phenomenon, which occurs when bits of seem-
ingly harmless information are combined to yield information that
is damaging to national security interests. The court in Progressive
accepted the government's argument that, even if information
originates in the public domain, national security interests allow
the government to impress classification and censorship if "when
drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information ac-
quires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irrepara-
ble harm to the interests of the United States."1 '' However, fur-
ther refinement of the definition of information in the public
domain is essential to facilitate prosecution under the espionage
statutes. The ISG group faced with prosecution will certainly at-
tempt to raise the defense, claiming that the information they pub-
lish is derived from public documents or is already known to the
general public even though the government is still taking affirma-
tive measures to conceal the exposed intelligence relationships.
The uninformative definition in section 793(d) and 793(e) of a
receiver as "one not entitled to receive" ' creates additional
problems. The phrase has been interpreted by the government to
mean a person who has neither a proper security clearance nor an
official duty in connection with the documents or information in-
volved.1 34 The Espionage Act of 1917,35 however, includes no pro-
the abstraction of a document relating to the national defense.
130. 584 F.2d at 39-40.
131. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). This action was brought under a provision of
the Atomic Energy Act which authorizes injunctive relief to prevent disclosure of restricted
data. 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1976).
132. 467 F. Supp. at 991.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) (1976).
134. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 4-101, 3 C.F.R. 190, 199 (1979).
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cess for determining which persons are "entitled to receive" de-
fense information.16 It has been argued that the use of executive
order classification standards to define this element is contrary to
the original congressional intent because Congress ultimately re-
jected the provision in conference. Furthermore, such standards
did not exist until the 1950's. 7 It has been further argued that
constitutional standards require that those "entitled to receive" in-
clude all who do not intend to harm the United States or to give
advantage to a foreign power."8"
Perhaps the most vexing aspects of the construction of these
statutes are the lack of a scienter requirement and the vagueness
of the term "relating to national defense" as it is used to define
materials or information prohibited from unauthorized dissemina-
tion. These two elements must be considered in tandem as the nar-
row interpretation of the requirement of "willful" dissemination
avoids the first amendment problems of vagueness and over-
breadth posed by a broad definition of the term "relating to the
national defense." This interrelationship was first recognized in the
seminal case of Gorin v. United States,5 9 in which Gorin, a Rus-
sian agent accused of obtaining intelligence reports from a Navy
employee, challenged the constitutionality of the Espionage Act of
1917 by asserting that the phrase "information relating to the na-
tional defense" was too vague to enable a well-meaning person to
determine whether a contemplated action was prohibited, and thus
that the Act violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1 40 The Court found no uncertainty in the phrase, de-
135. 40 Stat. 217.
136. See generally Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 111, at 1050-57.
137. Id.
138. This defense was raised in United States v. Russo, in which the government at-
tempted to apply the espionage statutes to publication and acts in preparation of publica-
tion. This case, generally referred to as the Pentagon Papers criminal prosecution, was the
first attempted prosecution in which an espionage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1976), was
used in a situation in which there was no alleged transfer of information to foreign agents
and no allegation that the defendants had intent or reason to believe that the material
would be used to the injury of the national defense or to the advantage of a foreign power.
Because a mistrial was declared before a verdict was reached, the issue of the applicability
of the statute was never decided.
The only part of the trial to be officially reported was a decision involving wiretapping.
See Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1219 (1972). The text of Judge Byrne's oral opinion is availa-
ble in Hearings on House Resolution 803, Statement of Information: House Judiciary
Comm. Impeachment Inquiry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., bk. VII, pt. 4, at 2076 (1974).
139. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
140. Id. at 23.
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fining it broadly as "a generic concept of broad connotations, refer-
ring to the military and naval establishments and the related activ-
ities of national preparedness. 14 1
The Court in Gorin also based its holding that the Act was not
unconstitutionally vague on the fact that the Act contains a spe-
cific scienter requirement, which requires that a defendant act with
intent or reason to believe that the information obtained be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any for-
eign nation.142 However, interpretation of the term "willfully" as it
has been used in prosecutions under section 793 requires no spe-
cific intent.1 4s The statutes on their face require only that the act
of "communicat[ing], deliver[ing] or transmit[ting] . . ." be "will-
ful" and that the disseminator have an appreciation for the signifi-
cance of the material he or she is communicating, as distinguished
from an intent to injure or to give advantage. 1 4 Thus, the Gorin
case creates problems for judges who have attempted to uphold
prosecutions brought under sections 793(d) and 793(e). Explana-
tions of why a scienter requirement per se is not necessary to with-
stand constitutional scrutiny largely have been dependent on the
interpretations accorded to other elements of the statute. If the
statute is applied to documents and information without regard to
source and "willfully" is not construed to permit evaluation of an
actor's motives in disclosing information, there may be an over-
breadth issue.1 45 If the statute is applied to simple communications
of national defense information without providing adequately defi-
nite standards for what information is covered and without regard
to the actor's appreciation of the information's defense-related sta-
tus, the problem of unconstitutional vagueness may arise.1 46 Be-
cause of the uncertainty and confusion inherent in the construc-
141. Id. at 28.
142. Id. at 27-28.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978) (injury to the
United States could be inferred from defendant's knowledge of illegal abstraction of docu-
ments); United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 910, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (possession of docu-
ments and attempt to transmit them to a codefendant who was not entitled to receive them
was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute without intent being shown). Cf. Du-
bin v. United States, 289 F.2d 651, 654 (1961) (in a civil action, refusal to surrender on
demand radar devices "relat[ing] to the national defense" which lawfully came into plain-
tiffs possession through governmental error, assumed by court to constitute violation of §
793(e) despite the absence of proof of an anti-United States motive).
144. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 6.
145. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 111, at 1031-46.
146. Id.
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tion of sections 793(d) and 793(e), the application of these sections
to members of the ISG in the hypothetical would be of doubtful
success.
Classified Information Statutes
The majority of classified information statutes are designed to
protect the disclosure of very specific categories of informa-
tion-cryptographic intelligence,4 communications intelligence,148
and data restricted under the Atomic Energy Act 149 -and, as such,
offer no real protection to the identity of covert intelligence opera-
tives. The identity of an operative may be protected, however,
under 50 United States Code section 783(b) 150 if certain conditions
are met. The information revealing identity must be classified by
the President or, with the approval of the President, by the head
of any government department or agency or by certain public cor-
porations. 151 The communication must also be made by federal and
"corporation" employees to any person whom such employees
know or have reason to believe is an agent of a foreign government
or an officer or member of the communist party. 52 In addition, the
disseminator must know or have reason to know that the informa-
tion disclosed has been classified.1 53 Disclosures made by former
employees and parties not in privity with the government are not
prohibited by this statute because these disseminators are not in-
cluded in the definition of "employees." Moreover, a group such as
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976).
148. Id.
149. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2281 (1976).
150. The text of 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1976) states: "It shall be unlawful for any officer
or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or of any corpora-
tion the stock of which is owned in whole or in major part by the United States or any
department or agency thereof, to communicate in any manner or by any means, to any other
person whom such officer or employee knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or
representative of any foreign government or an officer or member of any Communist organi-
zation as defined in paragraph (5) of section 782 of this title, any information of a kind
which shall have been classified by the President (or by the head of any such department,
agency, or corporation with the approval of the President) as affecting the security of the
United States, knowing or having reason to know that such information has been so classi-
fied, unless such officer or employee shall have been specifically authorized by the President,
or by the head of the department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or employee is
employed, to make such disclosure of such information."
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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the ISG could not be prosecuted unless the individual members
fell within the statute's definition of "government employees" or
"corporation employees," an unlikely event.
Attempts to prosecute persons disseminating classified infor-
mation under this statute may be frustrated in a number of ways.
First, the government has the difficult task of proving the agency
of the receiver and the disseminator's knowledge of that agency. It
also must show that the information is properly "classifiable" and
has been properly "classified." 1" The defense of authorization may
similarly frustrate the prosecution of higher level officials, as such
persons may claim authorization to declassify information.155
The ambiguous espionage statutes and the narrow classified
information statutes thus provide, at best, an ephemeral protection
for the identity of covert intelligence operatives. Such legislation
ceases to have the desired deterrent effect when prosecutors, para-
lyzed by uncertainty in the law and overwhelmed by enforcement
dilemmas, decline prosecution.
Framing the Problem
Since ancient times, governments have used clandestine opera-
tives to gather intelligence about foreign adversaries in order to
secure national boundaries. 156 Such intelligence gathering has
taken on even greater significance in the 20th century. 5 7 The tech-
nological "revolution," by making possible the means for vigorous
international trade and development as well as for warfare of
unprecedented destructive potential, has spawned a complex inter-
dependence of nations through trade alliances and defense pacts.158
National security thus has come to depend upon intelligent foreign
policy decisions that are based on insight into world political, eco-
154. Exec. Order No. 12,065, §§ 1-301 to -302, 3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979).
155. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 141.
156. See note 2 supra.
157. H.R. REP. No. 96-1219, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980) (examples of the
kinds of information, other than strategic force structure, that may be sought; for example,
information regarding nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, oil pricing policies, drug
trafficking, Third World economic growth, and the activities of hostile intelligence services).
158. For example, the United States has entered into an obligation to defend North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Japan, see Treaty of 1951, Sept. 29, 1951, 5
U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 2992, Security Treaty of 1960, Jan. 19, 1960, United States
-Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 373 U.N.T.S. 186, while the Soviet Union is
similarly involved in the Warsaw Pact.
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nomic and social forces, as well as upon traditional defense
preparedness based upon monitoring the military activities of ad-
versary nations.15 9 Clandestine intelligence gatherers, with their
unique ability to supply crucial insight into the actual plans and
intentions of foreign powers as well as their potential usefulness in
complementing overt government policy initiatives, remain irre-
placeable even in this age of electronic intelligence. 160
Secrecy is essential to the effectiveness of any intelligence
gathering operation.' Endeavors to collect information about the
plans and intentions of potential adversaries cannot succeed in a
climate that condones the revelation of the means by which those
endeavors are conducted.'6 2 This necessarily requires that the
identities of those persons whose cooperation is crucial to the col-
lection of intelligence be shielded from disclosure.
The consequences of the disclosure of identity are often formi-
dable and far reaching. On an individual level, "blowing cover"
jeopardizes the exposed operative's future career in intelligence
gathering operations and may endanger the operative's life and the
lives of members of his or her family or may pose the threat of
incarceration, loss of employment, and loss of reputation. 63
On a second level, disclosure may frustrate future intelligence
gathering operations of the sponsoring agency by (1) revealing the
methods of recruitment and operation employed by the sponsoring
agency, thereby facilitating the identification of additional opera-
tives;6 4 (2) compromising the professional effectiveness of intelli-
gence agents by requiring that they revert to more defensive, time
159. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1219, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980).
160. Id. at 4.
161. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(need for secrecy in intelligence information). See also National Security Act of 1947, 50
U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976) (CIA Director's duty to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure).
162. Contrary to the romantic jet-set scenarios drawn by writers of espionage fiction,
the work of an intelligence agent more commonly is painstakingly tedious. Agents of the
CIA routinely function as public relations personnel for the United States government.
Their mission essentially is to build contractual relationships with persons in key positions
not normally accessible to United States diplomats overseas. Success in effectuating and
perpetuating such a contractual relationship requires vigorous cultivation, infinite patience
and, above all, a high degree of trust. See FOIA Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of
Frank C. Carlucci).
163. Id.
164. Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, to the San Francisco
Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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consuming, and costly means of operation to avoid detection;"6 5 (3)
reducing the pool of experienced, unexposed agents from which to
draw; 6 (4) demoralizing current ranks of operatives;167 and (5)
discouraging success in future recruitment by casting doubt upon
the recruiting agency's ability to guarantee confidentiality.16 8
On a third level, such disclosures may adversely affect interna-
tional relations in several ways. For the sponsoring agency's gov-
ernment, disclosures can lead to embarrassment and may compli-
cate its relations with other governments. 6 9 For the leadership of a
nation in which such activity is discovered, the disclosure may fo-
ment internal political strife, the seriousness of which depends
upon the degree to which government officials are implicated in
the sponsoring agency's activities and the strength of local dissent
groups.17 0 Ultimately, the effect of disclosure may be amplified by
encouraging distrust of the sponsoring nation's foreign policy goals
and credibility, thereby reducing the potential for future recruit-
ment and discouraging the further cooperation of friendly foreign
governments. 71 Disclosure also has the effect of destroying the
sponsoring agency's ability to gather information crucial to the in-
tegrity of its own national security, which in turn threatens not
only the sponsoring nation's future, but also the welfare of those
nations with which it has agreed to trade or which it has promised
to defend. 172
No sponsoring agency has felt the damaging effects of disclo-
sure of identity more sharply than has the CIA. The regular ap-
pearance of names of suspected CIA agents in American anti-CIA
periodicals and books"'7 allegedly has caused the death of at least
one CIA officer and threats and assassination attempts upon the
lives of United States government employees abroad. 74 In addi-
tion, some United States activities abroad have been disrupted
generally. 7 5 Not only do such revelations lessen the future effec-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Intelligence Hearings, supra note 56, at 15 (statement of Frank C. Carlucci).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 14.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 17.
172. See notes 157, 160 supra.
173. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
174. See note 8 supra.
175. See note 8 supra.
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tiveness of the CIA by diminishing the pool of unexposed agents,
by demoralizing agents, and by discouraging future recruitment,
the publications carry with them a dangerous potential for destroy-
ing non-CIA interests as well. As the published lists may contain
names of nonoperatives as well as operatives, the lives and reputa-
tions of persons not charged with CIA operational responsibilities
are endangered, and non-CIA government operations and business
abroad may be disrupted.
Wary of the damage that disclosure of sensitive government
information can cause, certain nations have chosen to impose re-
straints upon the dissemination of certain categories of informa-
tion. 7 6 In the United States, by contrast, constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and representative gov-
ernment have fostered a policy of public access to government in-
formation as the rule rather than the exception. Therefore, re-
straints on dissemination are subject to strict scrutiny.
The United States's form of government fosters an inherent
conflict between two competing values, both of which are essential
to the preservation of democracy: the first amendment, which as-
sures the freedom of the individual to speak and to publish, and
the need for secrecy in the area of national security, which enables
the government, on behalf of its citizens, to assure an adequate
level of national defense. These competing values are engaged in a
balancing process that has constantly sought but has never at-
tained equilibrium.
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press were recognized
by the drafters of the Constitution as fundamental to ensuring rep-
resentative government.' Two theories'" explain this relation-
ship: (1) Through free speech and a free press, the public is given
the information necessary to engage in informed debate, to learn
the truth, and to make intelligent and informed decisions in the
election of its leaders and representatives; 7  and (2) the rights of
176. One example of such restraint is the British Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo.
V, c. 28, first passed in 1889, which penalizes revelation of any "official" information regard-
less of its relevance to national defense. For a discussion of provisions of the Act, see SE-
CRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 312-31 (T. Franck & E. Weisband ed. 1974).
177. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or tle right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
178. For an elaboration of the theories supporting free speech, see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
179. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-Gov-
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freedom of speech and freedom of the press ensure the accounta-
bility of the government to the people and preclude the usurpation
of power by a monolithic government that gains control over the
dissemination of information. 180
Yet, the drafters of the Constitution also recognized that the
most sacred ideals of freedom upon which a nation is built can be
lost if the nation itself lies vulnerable to attack and subjugation. 18'
Thus, while the courts carefully scrutinize circumstances in which
government claims of national security are used to justify imposing
restraints on first amendment freedoms, they also recognize cir-
cumstances in which the threat of harm to national security may
be sufficient to warrant imposition of prior restraints or subse-
quent punishment, or to justify invocation of claims of privilege.'82
There are two possible means by which the disclosure of iden-
tities of covert intelligence operatives may be restrained constitu-
tionally because of its demonstrable potential for harming national
security interests: imposing prior restraint or subsequent punish-
ment. As the narrow circumstances in which prior restraint may
be appropriate under the Constitution have been discussed previ-
ously,183 this discussion examines the circumstances in which sub-
sequent punishment may be appropriate.
To withstand constitutional scrutiny, regulations directed at
restricting "the communicative impact of. . . expression" must re-
strict speech that is outside the scope of first amendment protec-
tions.184 Speech may be shown to lack first amendment protection
when it comes within a recognized exception or when regulation is
necessary to further a compelling state interest.18 5 Under both cat-
egories, there must be a persuasive showing by proponents of the
regulation that the harm that the regulations seek to prevent could
not be prevented by dialogue,' that is, in the case of identity,
further discussion will not "put the secret back in the bag."
Incitement to do violent or illegal acts has been recognized as
ERNMENT (1st ed. 1948).
180. See generally J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, AND OTHER ESSAYS (E. Neff ed. 1926).
181. Congress has the power to protect national security by providing for the common
defense. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 15.
182. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
183. See notes 36-60 & accompanying text supra.
184. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602 (1978).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 602-03.
July 1981] IDENTITY PROTECTION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
one of the narrow categories of speech not protected by the first
amendment, and therefore may be censored without a showing of a
compelling state interest, under the theory that "[i]t is not plausi-
ble to uphold the right to use words as projectiles where no ex-
change of views is involved.'18 7 To distinguish advocacy entitled to
protection under the first amendment from incitement to do vio-
lent or illegal acts, Justice Holmes proposed in Schenck v. United
States'88 the "clear and present danger" test: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent."' 8 9 The "clear and present danger"
test was further developed into a two-pronged test in Brandenburg
v. Ohio,'90 which provides that a statute prohibiting certain types
of advocacy will be unconstitutional if not properly limited to
prohibiting advocacy (1) "directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action" and (2) "likely to incite or produce such
action."' 191
Certain problems are presented in attempting to apply the
Brandenburg two-pronged test to determine the constitutionality
of a statute that seeks to prevent the disclosure of identity in the
ISG hypothetical previously presented. The second prong of the
test, which requires that the advocacy sought to be restrained be
"likely to incite or produce [imminent lawless conduct]," may be
satisfied by reliance upon the recent history of terrorist attacks
growing out of disclosures similar to those in the ISG hypotheti-
cal.192 The first prong, however, may not be so clearly met. No case
has yet determined whether Brandenburg applies in a situation in
which a speaker advocates violence or illegal conduct by using
speech that does not literally advocate such actions. In the context
of the ISG hypothetical, the question arises whether disclosing the
identities of suspected CIA agents without specifically advocating
that those identified be harmed constitutes advocacy directed to
incite or produce imminent lawless conduct. To what extent, if
any, is awareness by ISG members that terrorist attacks are likely
187. Id. at 605.
188. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
189. Id. at 52.
190. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
191. Id. at 447.
192. See note 8 supra.
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to occur as a result of such disclosures determinative? Should sub-
jective intent of the speaker be considered decisive or can the req-
uisite advocacy directed at "imminent lawless action" be implied
from the speaker's knowledge that his or her speech is likely to
provoke acts of violence? Is it sufficient that a reasonable person
would take such speech as an incitement to violence?
Furthermore, it is not clear whether satisfaction of the first
prong of the Brandenburg test depends upon the disclosure having
been made to a definable "group" or a recognizable individual.
Case law seems to suggest that if a comment is directed to no one
in particular, sufficient incitement has not occurred. 193 Is publica-
tion to a subscription audience sufficient to show directed re-
marks? Does speaking before a press conference with later replay
to a national audience produce the requisite "directed" advocacy?
A second test for determining whether a particular type of
speech falls outside the protection of the first amendment is a bal-
ancing test involving the finding of a compelling state interest that
justifies restricting disclosure. 4 This approach, which essentially
involves weighing the need for confidentiality against the need for
public access, yields an analysis more favorable to the protection of
intelligence identity than the analysis under the clear and present
danger exception.
A broad prohibition against the publication of any information
relating to national security would be overwhelmingly burdensome
on first amendment rights and would approach the equivalent of
an official secrets act, which long has been scorned as unconstitu-
tional under our form of government."9 5 However, narrowly con-
structed prohibitions on public dissemination of certain specific
types of information, which are not necessary for informed public
debate and representation, may be desirable if the potential harm
that flows from such dissemination outweighs the potential harm
in restricting public access to the information."9 ' For example,
while an informed citizenry has a need to know of the govern-
ment's capability to engage in nuclear warfare, it does not need to
193. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
194. For a discussion of the balancing test, see generally Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963).
195. See note 176 supra.
196. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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know the exact location of missile silos and the composition of nu-
clear warheads. 197 If such details were released as public informa-
tion, the government would have no way of assuring that the infor-
mation would not fall into the hands of adversaries who would use
the information to their advantage."9 8
Specific facts relating to the identity of the CIA's intelligence
gatherers, such as name, duty station, address, and license plate
number, are not necessary to sustain informed debate and repre-
sentative government. It is conceivable that in unusual circum-
stances the identity of someone on the CIA payroll might become
important to public decisionmaking. For example, disclosure that
the head of a foreign country was receiving large sums of money
from the CIA might well call into question certain aspects of
United States foreign policy. Thus, under any kind of statutory
provision restricting disclosure of identity, it would appear that ex-
ception should be allowed for circumstances in which the defen-
dant demonstrates a compelling public need for disclosure. This
situation, however, is exceptional. More commonly, disclosures of
the identities of CIA intelligence operatives do not enhance legiti-
mate public ends, but instead produce a significant number of
damaging consequences. 199 Perhaps the most subtle harm that
such disclosures produce is that of stimulating an unquenchable
public thirst for access to secret information. Although a policy of
broad government accountability and disclosure serves the tenets
of democracy, indiscriminate revelation can cause much harm.
When the crucial difference between disclosure of impropriety and
disclosure of legitimate secrets ceases to be made clear, or becomes
unimportant, no information is safe from disclosure.
As a result of aggressive demands for broad access to govern-
ment information by a distrusting post-Watergate public and
press, public desensitization to the proper need for confidentiality
in certain government operations threatens the ability of the
United States to ensure secrecy when it legitimately is required.
Perhaps by equating secrecy with wrongdoing, the public now ex-
pects access to confidential government information through au-
thorized or unauthorized means. Thus, a self-sustained market for
confidential government information exists today that, unless con-
197. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
198. See notes 44-60 & accompanying text supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 163-75 supra.
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trolled, threatens continued indiscriminate and improper disclo-
sure of the identity of covert intelligence operatives as well as
other sensitive information. This is a particularly dangerous path
to follow as it ultimately may lead to auctioning of national secur-
ity for the curiosity seeker's short-lived thrill of access to confiden-
tial information and the deceptive satisfaction of individual over-
sight of government function.
The harm produced as a result of the disclosure of intelligence
identities has a serious potential for extending far beyond destruc-
tion of the future effectiveness of the CIA. As reactions to the pub-
lication of names of "suspected" CIA agents have shown, harm
may flow to non-CIA individuals and non-CIA government opera-
tions and business abroad as well.200 By not moving to avert such
destruction, the United States appears to give its tacit consent to
such activities in the eyes of the world and appears powerless to
control such activities. The cumulative effect of the harms result-
ing from unauthorized disclosure is potentially staggering: with
the perception of its loss of credibility and reputation, the United
States also may lose the cooperation of other nations and its power
to negotiate effectively in the world community; with the percep-
tion of its lowered resistance to attack abroad and infiltration at
home, the United States stands open for terrorism and violence;
with the perception of diminished operational effectiveness in na-
tional security, it stands open to challenges to its military presence
throughout the world. Thus, ultimately, not only national security
but the world balance of power may be threatened.
Application of a compelling state interest test to the disclosure
of identity necessitates a balancing of the public need for disclo-
sure against the risk of harm that such disclosure will produce. 0 1
The balancing process in this case is particularly difficult as there
are important principles to be preserved on both sides. While the
propensity of the risks of harm to national security suggests that a
finding of compelling state interest is justified, a statute that would
restrain disclosure of identity may still be unconstitutional if it is
overbroad 20 2 or vague.203 The final section of this Note considers
200. See note 8 supra.
201. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
202. A statute is overbroad and thus invalid on its face if it "does not aim specifically
at evils within the allowable area of [government] control but, on the contrary, sweeps
within its ambit other activities that . . . constitute an exercise of freedom of speech."
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the practical aspects of drafting legislation that would ensure that
identity is properly protected yet that would also conform to con-
stitutional safeguards.
Providing Necessary Protection for Identity
Under present law, the protection afforded information relat-
ing to the identity of covert intelligence operatives is tenuous. °0
Suggestions for improvement of that protection center upon ad-
ministrative remedies and legislative reform. Administrative reme-
dies center on improving the CIA's ability to provide cover 0 5 and
clandestine communications, while legislative reform 6 centers on
amending the FOIA and revising current espionage and classified
information laws. The discussion that follows focuses on possible
improvements for the protection of intelligence identities through
amendment of the FOIA and through enactment of a narrowly
constructed criminal statute, which would punish disclosure of in-
formation relating to the identity of covert intelligence gatherers.
Amending the FOIA
The FOIA and its accompanying exemptions provide a basic
scheme for determining what information the executive branch of
the federal government can legally withhold from the public. The
identity of intelligence operatives may be properly classified and
thus subject to exemptions under 5 United States Code section
552(b)(1) if "an original classification authority . . . determines
that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to
cause at least identifiable harm to national security. 21 0 7 However,
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). The Supreme Court in United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967), held that the government could proscribe conduct if a statute
precisely distinguishes that conduct which is punishable from activity protected by the first
amendment. However, a statute shall not be held facially invalid unless the chill on pro-
tected activities is substantial. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
203. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is closely related to the overbreadth doctrine.
Due process requires that criminal statutes must be reasonably definite in defining persons
and conduct within their scope and punishment for their violation. See Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-35 (1963).
204. See text accompanying notes 12-155 supra.
205. See note 17 supra.
206. For an example of recent reform legislation, see The Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1979) (provides judicial review of elec-
tronic surveillance activities).
207. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-301, 3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979).
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because classification or declassification and release is left to the
individual discretion of executive department personnel designated
to classify or to answer FOIA requests, and ultimately, to judicial
determination when decisions to withhold are challenged in
court,20 8 the full extent of the protection afforded by classification
remains uncertain.09
Furthermore, the CIA has suggested that the increased likeli-
hood of exposure of classified information as a result of FOIA re-
quest procedures may hamper its ability to continue to recruit
agents and sources, and therefore restrict its ability to function as
a viable intelligence gathering organization.210
One means by which the risk of disclosure might be lessened is
to reduce the total volume of FOIA requests. Such a reduction
could be effected by restricting FOIA responses to first person re-
quests, in which an individual requests information about himself
or herself contained in Agency files. Presently, the CIA responds
both to first person requests and to third party requests, in which
an individual or organization requests information about others or
about the operations of the Agency.211 By eliminating third party
responses, the Agency might be able to improve internal
security.212
Additionally, the Agency might attempt to gain more effective
control over the release of information having synergistic value.
208. See notes 27-32 & accompanying text supra.
209. See Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, to the San Fran-
cisco Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
210. Id.
211. See FOIA Hearing, supra note 29, at 13.
212. Id. at 6, 7, 13. Processing FOIA requests breaks down the CIA's system of com-
partmentalized recordkeeping. To process a request, all records and files relevant to the
particular request are drawn together and remain together throughout the request, appeal,
and litigation process. This exposes the information contained therein to far wider circula-
tion than normal and is inconsistent with good security practices. By reducing the volume of
FOIA requests, the Agency might cut down the circulation of sensitive information, thereby
reducing the chances of an inadvertent release of information.
In addition, elimination of third party requests could be expected to reduce signifi-
cantly the cost of processing FOIA requests and free additional employee hours for pursuit
of intelligence-related activities. Id. Such a measure would enable citizens to oversee accrual
of personal information about themselves by the government while placing in the hands of
the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees the responsibility for oversight of in-
telligence operations. This is in keeping with the designated function of the oversight com-
mittees; as elected representatives of the people, committee members are given authorized
access to confidential information about intelligence operations that must be withheld from
the general public for reasons of national security.
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Under the current FOIA procedures, a blind request method is em-
ployed. As the Agency employee who responds to the request does
not go beyond the request to learn the true identity and motive of
the person requesting the information, it is difficult for the Agency
to assess whether information that appears innocuous on the sur-
face might be particularly revealing when combined with facts al-
ready known to the person making the request. 13
It is unlikely, however, that reform of the blind request proce-
dure to allow for the authorization of investigations would provide
a viable solution to the threat of disclosure in most cases. First, the
cost and time consumed in the investigation would probably not be
equal to the benefit derived from such investigation. Second, infor-
mation synergy"" is a highly personalized phenomenon; thus, the
accuracy with which a request processor could predict the synergis-
tic potential of certain information is questionable. Furthermore,
such efforts to identify the individuals making the requests may
have adverse policy connotations and first amendment and privacy
implications.2 15
Statutes
The identities of covert intelligence gatherers may be pro-
tected statutorily either by extending the classic espionage laws216
to encompass disclosure or by constructing a new statute to impose
criminal sanctions for disclosure. The first alternative, extending
existing espionage laws to include disclosure, is less satisfactory.
The espionage laws suffer from numerous ambiguities in construc-
tion and interpretation that confuse and complicate their applica-
tion even to classic espionage situations.2117 Attempting to apply
such statutes to disclosures of identity, particularly when publica-
tion is involved, produces the uncomfortable and strained result of
grouping spies, information leakers, the press, and self-appointed
213. See FOIA Hearing, supra note 29, at 12-13.
214. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
215. Discrimination in terms of the information that individuals are allowed to receive
based upon individual identity or background would suggest that the status of the person
making the request and not the relationship of the material to national security should be
determinative of classification. Such a policy would seem to contradict essential principles
underlying the FOIA-that all individuals have equal rights of access to non-exempt materi-
als and that the burden should fall upon the government to justify the withholding of a
document, not upon the person requesting it.
216. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e), 794(a) (1976).
217. See text accompanying notes 95-146 supra.
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counterspies into a single statutorily defined class and ignores the
essential differences between disclosures made for legitimate first
amendment purposes and disclosures made in order to disadvan-
tage the United States or advantage foreign powers.
A more promising alternative would be to enact a criminal
statute that prohibits the disclosure of intelligence identities in
such a way that harmful disclosures are deterred while vital first
amendment rights are preserved. The concept of criminalizing such
disclosure is not new. A number of bills proposed during the 96th
Congress presented alternative designs for such a statute.218 Al-
though legislators generally agree on the need for better protection
of intelligence identities, opinions vary widely on whether a crimi-
nal statute that would have the effect of imposing restraints on the
press as well as on private citizens is the proper means to provide
such protection.21 The following discussion focuses upon the con-
siderations that must be taken into account in defining the ele-
ments of a criminal antidisclosure statute and analyzes the effects
that such a statute could reasonably be expected to have on the
present identity protection crisis.
Defining "Disseminator"
In defining those disseminators who should be subject to crim-
inal sanctions, the types of disclosures that have been troublesome
to the government in recent years should be recalled: (1) disclo-
sures by those in privity with the government who have had au-
thorized access to classified information, 220 and (2) disclosures by
individuals or groups of individuals who, without authorized ac-
cess, search public records and conduct surveillance and interviews
in order to construct and publish the identities of persons they_
suspect to be intelligence operatives.221
Criminal sanctions are generally considered inappropriate in
218. Such proposals have included H.R. 3356, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3357,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3496, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4291, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 5615, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The text of these bills is reproduced
in Intelligence Hearings, supra note 56, at 151-57. The Senate bill which corresponded to
H.R. 5616 was S. 2216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
219. Compare H.R. REP. No. 96-1219, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 12-18 (1980) (dis-
senting views of Representatives Rodino, Jr., Edwards, Kastenmeier, Seiberling, Drinan,
and Holtzman) with id. at 19-22 (views of Representatives McClory, Hyde, Ashbrook, and
Sensenbrenner).
220. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 141.
221. See note 7 & text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
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the absence of mens rea.222 To deter disclosure effectively, safic-
tions must apply both to persons who have authorized access to
classifed information and to persons who do not. To do otherwise
would imply that the identities of intelligence operatives deserve to
be protected in some instances but not in others, and that the dif-
ference depends not on the quality or harmfulness of the disclo-
sure, but rather on the status of the person responsible for making
the disclosure. Therefore, in order for disseminators to be held
criminally liable, some element of fault must be shown.2
The manner in which the mens rea requirement may be satis-
fied differs with respect to the two categories of disseminators.
Those who have been authorized to have access to classified infor-
mation or have taken a secrecy oath stand in a special relationship
of trust to the government and owe a duty of nondisclosure to the
government, which they have voluntarily and knowingly under-
taken.224 When they disclose the identity of a covert operative
knowing it to be classified, they directly breach this duty and
knowingly risk harm to the national security. That knowledge, cou-
pled with the intentional act of disclosure, is sufficie nt to establish
mens rea. Revelation of the classified identity of a covert intelli-
gence operative by those having authorized access to classified in-
formation therefore should be properly punishable by criminal
sanction.
A more difficult case of establishing "fault" is presented in
drafting a statute to prohibit the disclosure of identity by those
who do not have authorized access to classified information and,
therefore, owe no special duty of nondisclosure to the government.
The least problematic of the classical espionage laws, 18 United
States'Code Section 794(a), requires a showing that the dissemina-
tor acted with intent to injure the United States or to give advan-
tage to a foreign nation.22 5 In view of the difficulties presented in
interpreting and enforcing a statute that lacks an express scienter
requirement, 228 an antidisclosure statute, which is intended to ap-
222. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 192 (1972).
223. The fault element is most commonly shown by: (1) intention to do the forbidden
act or to cause the forbidden result, (2) knowledge of the nature of the act or the result that
will follow from it or of attendant circumstances, (3) recklessness in doing an act or in caus-
ing the result, or (4) negligence in creating an unreasonable risk. Id. at 194.
224. See notes 85-87 & accompanying text supra.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976).
226. See notes 139-46 & accompanying text supra.
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ply to those who disclose identity without having authorized ac-
cess, should require proof of intent either to injure the United
States or to give advantage to a foreign power. Such an intent re-
quirement could be satisfied either by a showing that the defen-
dant consciously desired the result or that the defendant knew
that the result was substantially certain to follow from his or her
actions.
Two recent legislative proposals sought to deal with the defini-
tion of disseminator by distinguishing three separate offenses of
disclosure.22 7 Under the proposals, two offenses with differing pen-
alties would be available to prosecute disseminators who were
given authorized access to classified information. The more serious
offense would apply to a disseminator who has been given author-
ized access to classified information that identifies a covert opera-
tive;228 the lesser offense would apply to a disseminator who has
been given authorized access to classified information, although
not to identity information specifically, and who learns a covert
operative's identity directly or indirectly through his or her posi-
tion.229 The difference in penalty imposed in each case is justified
on the basis that a higher degree of trust is placed in the dissemi-
nator who has been given authorized access to classified identity
information. 230
The third offense would apply to those who do not have au-
thorized access to classified information, but who discover and dis-
close identities merely for the sake of exposing covert operatives,
rather than for such first amendment purposes as reporting intelli-
227. The recent legislative proposals discussed in this Note are H.R. 5615, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Intelligence Hearings, supra note 56, at 155-57 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 5615], and S. 2216, supra note 17.
228. Section 501(a) of S. 2216 states: "Whoever, having or having had authorized ac-
cess to classified information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any infor-
mation identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that
the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence
relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both." The wording of H.R. 5615 is similar.
229. Section 501(b) of S. 2216 states: "Whoever, as a result of having authorized access
to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any
information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classi-
fied information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and
that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelli-
gence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." The wording of H.R. 5615 is similar.
230. S. REP. No. 96-896, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1980).
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gence agency abuses or criticizing foreign policy.2 31 In order to pro-
tect legitimate first amendment activities, legislators proposed that
the government bear the burden of proving that the individual is
engaged "in the course of a pattern of activity intended to identify
and expose covert agents. 2 32 This designation is meant to ensure
that the proposed statute would be available to prosecute only
those disseminators who engage in "a series of acts with a common
purpose or objective" rather than isolated incidences of
disclosure.23 3
In all three offenses, specific intent requirements are expressly
imposed. In the two offenses applying to those having authorized
access, the proposed legislation requires proof that the dissemina-
tor made the disclosure (1) intentionally, (2) knowing that the in-
formation disclosed identifies a covert operative, and (3) knowing
that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal
the operative's intelligence relationship to the United States.23 4 For
those without authorized access, the proposed legislation requires
that the government prove that the disclosure was made in the
course of a pattern of activities. This requires a showing that (1) a
series of acts having a common purpose or objective existed, (2)
the purpose of the pattern of activities was to uncover and expose
covert operatives, (3) there was reason to believe that such activi-
ties would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of
the United States, and (4) the disseminator knew that the govern-
ment was taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert opera-
tive's intelligence relationship to the United States.3 5The emphasis in the proposed legislation on acts done with
specific intent rather than with mere knowledge further assures
protection to those involved in first amendment activities. For ex-
231. Section 501(c) of S. 2216 states: "Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities
intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities
would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any
information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized
to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such
individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individ-
ual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than
$15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." The wording of H.R. 5615 is
similar.
232. Id.
233. S. 2216, supra note 17, § 506(10).
234. See notes 228-29 supra.
235. See note 231 supra.
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ample, a news reporter under this requirement would be subject to
sanctions only if it could be proven that he or she engaged in a
pattern of activities with the requisite intent to "uncover" and
"expose" covert operations. The "uncovering" and "exposure"
would not be punishable if they were merely ancillary to the news
reporter's conduct, even if it could be anticipated that the investi-
gation would reveal the identity of covert operatives.
All three offenses contained in the proposed legislation were
narrowly drawn to accommodate first amendment interests. In ad-
dition to the strict scienter requirement, which confines prosecu-
tion to the most egregious of acts, the legislative proposals con-
tained an additional safeguard that specifically exempts disclosures
made to congressional oversight committees, and thus preserves an
avenue for "whistle blowers. 23 6 The House bill also specifically
provided that proof of intentional disclosure is not itself sufficient
proof of the requisite specific intent to impair United States intel-
ligence activities.23 7
Defining "Receiver"
The second issue that must be addressed in attempting to
draft an antidisclosure statute involves determining to whom the
disclosure or identification must be made in order that criminal
sanctions apply to the disseminator. Classic espionage statutes re-
quire transmission to a foreign power or agent thereof,238 or to "an-
"yone not entitled to receive. ' 23 9 Neither terminology is satisfacto-
rily applied to the disclosure of an intelligence identity. As the
mere uncovering of an intelligence relationship that the govern-
ment is attempting to conceal destroys the operative's future use-
fulness in a covert capacity regardless of whether his or her life is
endangered, revealing the relationship to the general public is det-
rimental. For purposes of statutory construction, restricting offen-
sive communication to "those not entitled to receive classified in-
formation" probably functions as the least ambiguous, most
narrowly drawn alternative.
The covert nature of intelligence operations logically can be
better preserved if the identity of the operative involved is known
236. See H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 502(d); S. 2216, supra note 17, § 502(c).
237. H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 502(c).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976).
239. Id. § 793(d)-(e).
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only by persons who will keep the fact of the intelligence relation-
ship secret. Individuals who have been afforded authorized access
to classified information or have signed a secrecy agreement have
voluntarily assumed an obligation of nondisclosure4 0 and normally
have undergone a field investigation and, in many cases, a poly-
graph examination. The Agency is thereby reasonably assured of
the trustworthiness of particular individuals in determining who
will be given access to classified information. By defining those not
entitled to receive as persons without authorized access to classi-
fied information, a statute may attempt to ensure protection of
sensitive intelligence identity information by restricting lawful dis-
semination to those individuals whom the Agency considers to be
trustworthy. Although adhering to such a designation might not
inpenetrably insulate an intelligence identity from intentional dis-
closure,24 ' it would provide a more precise definition for purposes
of notice and prosecution than the ambiguous and uninstructive
phraseology "not entitled to receive" found in the current espio-
nage statutes.242
Recent legislative proposals have defined receiver as "any in-
dividual not entitled to receive classified information." 43 By so
designating the term receiver, the proposed statutes provide for
disclosure to congressional oversight committees, the members of
which are authorized to receive classified information, and assure
that the necessary and constructive activity of whistle-blowing is
not stifled.
Defining "Information to'Be Restricted"
An unlimited variety of disclosures can trigger the identifica-
tion process depending upon the information and experience previ-
ously possessed by the receiver.244 How such a variety of informa-
240. See text accompanying notes 61-62, 85-87 supra.
241. See text accompanying notes 33, 88 supra.
242. See notes 133-38 & accompanying text supra.
243. See notes 228, 229, 231 supra. '
244. See text accompanying note 211 supra. In United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467
F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), the court recognized that collating and collecting informa-
tion about nuclear bomb design from public sources in order to publish details of construc-
tion required certain knowledge and motivation that might not be possessed by all. "Even if
some of the information is in the public domain, due recognition must be given to the
human skills and expertise involved in writing [an] article. The author needed sufficient
expertise to recognize relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, information and to assimilate the
information obtained. The right questions had to be asked or the correct educated guesses
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tion can be generically categorized so that it is broad enough to
deter unauthorized disclosures yet specific enough to avoid chal-
lenges for overbreadth 245 and vagueness,246 is one of the most diffi-
cult tasks in constructing an identity protection statute.
The concept of identification itself should first be examined.
For purposes of conceptualization, it may be helpful to separate
the "labeling" aspect of identification by which the intelligence re-
lationship between a covert operative and the CIA is revealed, and
the "distinguishing" aspect by which operative A is distinguished
physically from individual B. To illustrate, a labeling statement is
"John Smith is working for the CIA"; a distinguishing statement is
"John Smith drives a Y model car with license plate number
XXX. ' '247 Labeling constitutes a harmful act, as it destroys an in-
telligence operative's future usefulness in covert intelligence opera-
tions, impairs the Agency's operational effectiveness, and may re-
sult in adverse counterintelligence or a terrorist attack upon the
life of an exposed operative. 24 '8 Distinguishing, by contrast, pro-
vides a means of physically identifying or "targeting" a person.
Often labeling and distinguishing may be inextricably inter-
twined in a single disclosure, and both may be accomplished with-
out revealing names. For example, the statement, "One CIA agent
has a Y model car with license number XXX," effectively labels
the operative by disclosing distinguishing information. In addition,
distinguishing information may be given subsequent to an act of
labeling that was perpetrated by another party. For example, C
knows that D has labeled Joe Jones as a CIA agent. C then gives
distinguishing information, such as Joe Jones's address and physi-
cal description, to another party who knows of the labeling so that
he or she will be able to single out Jones. Thus, in the case of an
intelligence operative, a disclosure of distinguishing information
concurrent with or subsequent to "labeling" may enable adversa-
ries to identify the operative.
Recent legislative proposals have not differentiated between
had to be made," Id. at 993. The court determined that the author by his actions essentially
provided to those wishing to accelerate their acquisition of nuclear expertise a "ticket to by-
pass blind alleys." Id.
245. See note 202 supra.
246. See note 203 supra.
247. Distinguishing information can include, for example, physical characteristics, an
address, or the description of one's automobile, telephone number, or personal habits.
248. See notes 163-75 & accompanying text supra.
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the acts of labeling and distinguishing, but prohibit only disclo-
sures of "information that identifies a covert agent" without at-
tempting to define the phrase.149 As a result, the quantity and
quality of information that must be released before identification
can occur is not clear. An aggregate of purely distinguishing infor-
mation theoretically could reveal an intelligence relationship if la-
beling could be inferred from personal knowledge or common expe-
rience. For example, if an individual knew that CIA agents
commonly held a certain title at a certain embassy, drove Y model
cars, and frequented certain spots, a disclosure of this kind of in-
formation could facilitate identification even though overt labeling
had not occurred.
Defining "identification" can pose complicated semantic
problems. Trying to specify too precisely the circumstances under
which identification occurs could result in a statute that is so com-
plicated that it is ineffective because impossible to enforce. On the
other hand, if the legislature makes no attempt to define this ac-
tion, the courts may find the statute invalid because overbroad.
One alternative would be to define information that identifies cov-
ert intelligence operatives as either information that reveals the
covert operative's intelligence relationship to the CIA or an inten-
tional aggregation of other information, such as distinguishing in-
formation, sufficiently harmful to pose a threat to the life of an
intelligence operative.
The second step in defining the information to be restricted is
determining who is to be included in the definition of "covert oper-
ative." This element focuses upon relationships that are most criti-
cal to the vitality of the intelligence operation and upon operatives
who are the most likely to sustain personal harm if identi-
fied-CIA personnel abroad and sources who remain in a hostile
environment. For this reason, recent legislative proposals defined
covert operatives as: (1) officers or employees of, or members of
the Armed Forces assigned to, an intelligence agency whose identi-
ties are classified and who are serving outside the United States at
the time of the disclosure or have so served within the previous
five years;2 ° (2) United States citizens outside the country who are
249. See S. 2216, supra note 17, § 501(a)-(b). Similar wording exists in H.R. 5615,
supra note 227, § 501(a)-(b).
250. H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 501(a)-(b); S. 2216, supra note 17, § 506(4)(A)-(C).
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agents, informants, or sources of operational assistance25' to an in-
telligence agency;252 and (3) present or former agents of an intelli-
gence agency and informants or sources of operational assistance
to an intelligence agency whose identities are classified and who
are not United States citizens.53 In each case above, the intelli-
gence relationship must be classified information.
Such a proposal, however, fails to take into account protection
for domestic sources who, while perhaps less likely to suffer physi-
cal harm than those residing outside the United States, may still
sustain damage to business or personal relationships if their affilia-
tion with the CIA is disclosed. Protection for these individuals is
especially crucial if the CIA is to be able to improve cover for intel-
ligence officers abroad, because United States citizens in this coun-
try may assist in arranging cover protection for intelligence officers
abroad and in conducting activity abroad from a United States
base. 54 An identity protection statute should extend protection to
both citizens and foreigners residing in the United States who are
actively engaged in an intelligence relationship with the CIA.
A third consideration in designating the information to be pro-
tected from disclosure under an intelligence identity protection
statute is whether information disclosed by a disseminator under
the statute must be classified. If the prohibited act is restricted to
"labeling" and the intelligence relationship of the covert operative
is classified, the disclosure will always be 'one of classified informa-
tion. If the prohibited act is extended to include disclosure of
"distinguishing" information or a harmful aggregate of informa-
tion, the question becomes whether the disclosure of information
that either is classifiable but not classified or is unclassifiable
should be punishable.255
The espionage laws do not require that information illegally
disseminated be classified, only that it be harmful to national de-
fense.256 A broad interpretation of material 'that constitutes na-
tional defense information was allowed in Gorin because of accom-
251. "Agents," "informants," and "sources of operational assistance" do not include
individuals who are citizens of the United States residing within the United States. H.R.
5615, supra note 227, § 505(6).
252. Id. § 501(a)-(b); S. 2216, supra note 17, § 506(4)(A)-(C).
253. H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 501(a)-(b); S. 2216, supra note 17, § 506(4)(A)-(C).
254. See Intelligence Hearings, supra note 56, at 128.
255. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
256. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
July 19811 IDENTITY PROTECTION
panying strict scienter requirements, which had the effect of
assuring that an individual be informed specifically of what actions
were prohibited under the statute.257 The strict scienter require-
ments of the legislative proposals would appear to overcome any
vagueness in the definition of-information that identifies the covert
operative.
Defenses and Exceptions to Prosecution
Specific enumeration of defenses to prosecution under an
identity protection statute is particularly helpful in narrowing the
reach of the statute and assuring that first amendment rights of
the public to engage in political speech and informed debate are
not compromised.2 5 A situation in which disclosure of a covert op-
erative's identity might be necessary to informed debate regarding
foreign policy, for example, merits express protection. Enumerated
defenses or exemptions to future legislative proposals would ensure
for first amendment purposes that such a disclosure is protected
from prosecution.
Recently proposed legislation provided that 'disclosure made to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or to the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House would be
exempt from prosecution.25 9 In addition, a provision in the Senate
legislative proposal explicitly guaranteed exemptions for activities
protected by the first amendment and gave examples of the type of
activity that would be protected, including news reporting of intel-
ligence failures or abuses, academic studies of government policies
and programs, and enforcement by a private organization of its in-
ternal rules and regulations. 2 0 This provision was added primarily
to fortify the legislation against attacks alleging that the legislation
is void for vagueness.26' It served to explain further the language of
the statute by setting forth specific examples of first amendment
activities that the government could not prosecute so that the
press and others would have a clear understanding of what actions
were prohibited. As most news reporting is sufficiently protected
257. See text accompanying notes 139-42 supra.
258. The specifically enumerated defenses discussed in this Note are in addition to the
protections traditionally associated with the United States' criminal justice s-stem, such as
a standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" and protection against self incrimination.
259. See H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 502(d); S. 2216, supra note 17, § 502(c).
260. S. 2216, supra note 17, § 502(e).
261. See S. REP. No. 96-990, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1980).
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by the stringent intent requirements of the proposed statute, how-
ever, it is doubtful that an elaboration by specific example is essen-
tial to dispel vagueness.
The defense of "information in the public domain" appears to
have a much narrower application than the express exemptions
discussed above. Under the legislative proposals, it would be a
defense that "before the commission of the offense . .. the U.S.
... publicly acknowledged or revealed the intelligence relation-
ship ... "I The rationale for this defense is that, by publicly
acknowledging or revealing the intelligence relationship, the gov-
ernment brings the information into the public domain. The in-
tended scope of this proposed defense, however, is quite restricted,
requiring that public acknowledgment or revelation by the govern-
ment be direct; the defense would not include information that can
be derived only by comparing and collating various sources, even
though the sources .are public documents. 6 3 This would be in
keeping with the courts' traditional reluctance to find that infor-
mation available to the public is in the public domain when the
government is still attempting to conceal the information. 64 Thus,
it appears that the disclosure of an intelligence relationship that is
discernible from the examination of public sources is not defensi-
ble on the grounds of information in the public domain when the
government is seeking to conceal the relationship.
A Workable Proposal
While the most thorough and satisfactory legislative solution
to ensure the protection of an intelligence identity and eliminate
the ambiguities that underlie current law ultimately could be
found through passage of CIA charter legislation, 6 5 such a charter
would require enormous outlays of legislative time and resources
for approval. However, the need for action to deter threats to the
lives of intelligence operatives and to ensure the vitality of the gov-
ernment's intelligence gathering apparatus is immediate. A nar-
rowly drawn statute directed at punishing specific, harmful disclo-
sures of identity is more likely to be timely enacted than a
262. Id. § 502(a); H.R. 5615, supra note 227, § 502(a).
263. S. REP. No. 96-896, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980).
264. See notes 123-32 & accompanying text supra.
265. For one example of a legislative solution, see Espionage Hearings, supra note 9,
at 147-48 (statement of William E. Colby).
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cumbersome and lengthy charter legislation requiring much debate
and compromise.
Recent legislative proposals have been carefully constructed to
restrict only those knowing and intentional disclosures made to ex-
pose covert intelligence identities and to impair and impede the
intelligence activities of the United States. 266 Critics of these bills
nonetheless have expressed fear that by extending the possibility
of sanctions to publication, future freedom of the press may be se-
riously jeopardized. Passing such legislation, they claim, would be
tantamount to opening the door to future legislation that would
"unchain" the CIA, abrogate government accountability to the
people, and encourage the use of secrecy to protect the Agency's
reputation by concealing mistakes and misdeeds. The Supreme
Court,267 however, has never declared the press to be absolutely
immune from criminal sanctions when restraint on publication is
warranted; rather, it has expressed its preference for subsequent
punishment over the more burdensome, chilling remedy of prior
restraint.268 Recent legislative proposals have grown out of the de-
sire to provide an immediate deterrent against harmful disclosures
while affording the accused full exercise of his or her rights under
the substantive criminal law. The stringent and narrow intent and
knowledge requirements of the proposed legislation assure that
only those who are in the business of exposing the identities of
covert intelligence operatives and impairing and impeding United
States foreign intelligence efforts can be prosecuted.
Although the strength of intelligence identity protection stat-
utes as a deterrent to future unlawful conduct depends upon suc-
cessful enforcement,269 the identity disclosure problem has unique
characteristics that may make it more amenable to statutory pro-
hibition than disclosures of other sensitive information. For exam-
26.6. See notes 220-64 & accompanying text supra.
267. See New York Times, Sept. 4, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
268. See note 80 supra.
269. The extent to which the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, will resolve in practice the longstanding graymail dilemma of
"disclose or dismiss" in cases involving sensitive government information is still not fully
known. Graymail is a threat by the defendant to disclose classified information in the course
of trial. The Act creates a procedure for securing pretrial rulings in order to determine
whether classified information may be disclosed at pretrial or trial proceedings, and it au-
thorizes the government to take interlocutory appeals from adverse district court orders
relating to disclosure of classified information. The Act also provides for appropriate protec-
tive orders to safeguard classified information disclosed to the defendants.
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ple, only a few small groups have propagated the bulk of the dis-
closures.270 Thus, only a very small number of successful
prosecutions would be necessary to arrest the proliferation of in-
formation identifying intelligence operatives and deter future
disclosures.
A criminal statute also carries important implications for the
future use of contractual remedies used by the CIA in cases in
which those in privity with the Agency publish in violation of their
secrecy agreements.2 7 1 As an exclusive remedy for disclosure of
identity, such a statute would obviate the need for the "draconian"
and "undignified 272 contractual remedies now imposed upon those
who seek to publish without the benefit of prepublication clearance
from the Agency. A statutory remedy would also be more protec-
tive of the rights of the accused because prosecution under a crimi-
nal statute brings into play a panoply of constitutional rights
designed to ensure a fair trial.
Finally, such legislation could serve as a most valuable and
visible first step to the more extensive reform needed in the area of
national security and could allow the United States to provide
sources with the protection called for in the National Security
Act.27 3 It could provide a means by which the United States can
take affirmative action to halt the erosion of trust in its ability to
guarantee confidentiality to covert intelligence operatives and the
cumulative damage to its intelligence capabilities that disclosures
of identity cause.274
270. The groups that have been specifically identified in congressional hearings are
those who have published Counter-Spy magazine and the Covert Action Information Bulle-
tin. Counter-Spy magazine ceased publication for a period but had resumed publication as
of January, 1980 under the name of "U.S. Intelligence." See note 8 supra. The Covert Ac-
tion Information Bulletin is published by Covert Action Publications, a District of Colum-
bia nonprofit organization. See note 7 supra. Both publications have made a practice of
publishing lists of suspected U.S. intelligence operatives abroad. See Intelligence Hearings,
supra note 56, at 60 (statement of Jack Blake).
271. See text accompanying notes 82-94 supra.
272. See Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 146-47 (statement of William E.
Colby). Contractual remedies are undignified because they place the government in the po-
sition of seeking royalties rather than punishment.
273. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
274. See text accompanying note 164-68 supra.
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Conclusion
As the threat of nuclear proliferation dominated foreign policy
decisions of the 1950's and 1960's, so knowledge of limited world
resources promises to dominate those of the 1980's. Intelligence
thus promises to become a greater part of survival than ever
before. 5
Affording protection to the identities of covert intelligence op-
eratives is an essential element in guaranteeing the vitality of an
intelligence gathering mission. As current substantive law is vague
and enforcement uncertain, however, there is at present little law
upon which the United States can fashion guarantees of
confidentiality.
The need for extensive overhaul of legislation in this area, in-
cluding a CIA charter, is great. Although neither amending the
FOIA to include a specific exemption for identity information nor
enacting a statute, to make disclosure of information revealing in-
telligence identity a criminal act will solve all problems confronting
the future of the United States intelligence operations abroad,
such legislation would be a most valuable and visible first step to-
wards the more extensive reform needed in the area of national
security. It would provide a model around which a comprehensive
package of legislative reform could be developed, yet would also
enable immediate action to be taken against disclosure before fur-
ther trust in the United States is eroded. Such legislation poten-
tially would diminish both threats upon the lives of intelligence
operatives and disruptions of United States operations abroad,
without infringing upon the constitutional rights of those who
speak out against governmental impropriety.
The suggested legislative action to amend the FOIA and enact
a criminal statute to protect intelligence operative identities has
potential far-reaching implications for preserving this nation's ide-
als of freedom and democracy. First, an adequate criminal statute
safeguards against overclassification and an overall increase of se-
crecy in government:
[F]ailure to protect secrecy can result, paradoxically, in the in-
275. Stansfield Turner, former Director of the CIA, predicts that tighter energy sup-
plies in the 1980's coupled with a growing Soviet perception that the USSR is no longer
militarily inferior to the Unitdd States will require the United States to become "more as-
tute, more foresightful" with respect to foreign policy decisions in the decade to come. The
San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 12, 1980, § B, at 4, col. 1.
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crease in secrecy in policy formation. If the legal order legitimates
the view that respect for secrecy is only a matter of political com-
mitment, the likely response of decision-makers will be to make
secrets available to only a few trusted subordinates. Thus, the
law's failure to give weight to security considerations will aug-
ment the tendency to centralize power into fewer hands.276
Second, by pursuing such a legislative solution, the United States
would not only set an example for the rest of the world by hon-
oring foreign policy commitments-militarily, economically, and
technologically-but also would illustrate that both free speech
and strong national security can and must coexist successfully in a
democratic state. Enacting such a protection statute ultimately
would announce to the world that "we Americans will not follow
the traditional idea of total secrecy about intelligence, but that we
can and will protect its necessary secret, our sources and tech-
niques.'-277 Finally, providing such protection would safeguard
those -constitutional freedoms held most sacred, for without ade-
quate national security, there may no longer remain constitutional
rights or principles to preserve.
276. Espionage Hearings, supra note 9, at 113-14.
277. Id. at 149.
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